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Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS - STATUTORY INTERPRETATION -
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE - COMMUNICATIONS ACT
- The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied independent
Internet service providers (ISPs), competing telecommunications
service providers, cable modem providers, and various public in-
terest groups' petitions for review of final order of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) that relieves telephone com-
panies of any obligation to grant competing ISPs nondiscrimina-
tory access to their wireline (DSL) transmission facilities.
Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007).
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I. A SUMMARY OF THE TIME WARNER TELECOM OPINION
In 2005, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"the Agency") entered an order entitled "Appropriate Framework
for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities"1 ("the
Wireline Broadband Order").2 The order substantially limited fed-
eral regulation of broadband Internet access service that is pro-
vided over traditional telephone lines ("DSL" service) and relieved
telephone companies of regulations requiring them to grant com-
peting Internet Service Providers 3 ("ISPs") nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to their telephone lines ("wirelines"), which is necessary in
order to reach subscribers of high-speed Internet service. 4 The
result of the Wireline Broadband Order is that telephone compa-
nies are now permitted to negotiate individual deals with inde-
pendent ISPs, as well as other entities that plan to use their wire-
line facilities. 5
Four petitions were filed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit requiring review of the order.6 These peti-
tions were filed by several independent ISPs, competing telecom-
munications service providers, cable modem providers, and vari-
ous public interest organizations, including telecommunications
service provider Time Warner Telecom, Inc., independent ISP
1. 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005).
2. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 2007).
3. An Internet Service Provider is a company that provides physical connection of the
Internet to consumers. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 209 (citing WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246
F.3d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv.
("Brand X'), 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005)). ISPs also enable the conversion between digital
data transmitted over Internet and user-end information so that consumers can view in-
formation on their own computers and send it to other computers linked to the Internet.
Id. (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 974).
4. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 208. Two principle types of broadband services exist to
provide high-speed Internet access: (1) cable modem service and (2) Digital Subscriber Line
(DSL) service; DSL service is the type of broadband that Wireline Broadband Order con-
cerns. Id. at 209. DSL services use telephone lines to transmit Internet data by connecting
two DSL modems to a telephone network, one at the user end and the other at the tele-
phone company's center office. Id. (citing WorldCom, 246 F.3d at 692). When a wireline
carries both ordinary telephone calls and Internet services, the telephone company sepa-
rates the two types of transmissions-it sends voice streams to the telephone network and
data to a "packet-switched data network"; then the data is routed to an ISP. Id.
5. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 208.
6. Id. at 205.
Time Warner v. FCC
EarthLink, Inc., and the trade association COMPTEL. 7 A number
of telephone companies intervened8 in support of the FCC.9 The
court combined the four petitions and issued one opinion.10 The
petitioners contended that the Wireline Broadband Order allowed
telephone companies to deny their competitors (independent ISPs)
access to their wirelines and claimed that the order would result
in both decreased competition and limited consumer choice in the
high-speed Internet service market." The Agency argued that the
decades-old regulatory scheme restrained telephone companies
and significantly drove up their costs; consequently, little incen-
tive existed for those telephone companies to make innovations
and investments in new broadband technologies and service. 12
The court found that the FCC's interpretation of regulations, spe-
cifically the Communications Act of 1934,13 had been reasonable
and that the FCC had not abused its discretion. 14 The petition for
review was therefore denied. 15
Justice Fuentes delivered the opinion of the court. 16 He began
by providing a background introduction of the technical aspect and
regulatory context of the Wireline Broadband Order and provided
a general overview of the statutory treatment of broadband Inter-
net access service. 17 In the technical background section of the
opinion, he explained the concepts of local exchange and local ex-
7. Id. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. is the petitioner in case No. 05-4769. Earthlink,
Inc. is the petitioner in case No. 05-5153. Comptel is the petitioner in case No. 06-1466.
ACN Communications Services, Inc., Broadwing Communications, LLC., Integra Telecom,
Inc., McLeodUSA Telecommunications Services, Inc., Mpower Communications Corp., and
Pac-West Telecomm, Inc. are petitioners in case No. 06-1467. Id.
8. Intervention is the "entry into a lawsuit by a third party who, despite not being
named a party to the action, has a personal stake in the outcome." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 840 (8th ed. 2004).
9. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 207. Companies that intervened for the FCC included
BellSouth Corp., AT&T, Inc., Qwest Services Corporation, Verizon telephone companies,
and Montana Sky Networks, Inc. See id.
10. Id. at 205.
11. Id. at 208.
12. Id.
13. 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2006)).
14. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 208. The applicable standard of review required the
federal court to "defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of any ambiguities in a
statute which it administers," and the court may hold unlawful and "set aside" agency
conclusions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion .... " Time Warner, 507
F.3d at 214 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006)).
15. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 208.
16. Id. at 208. The three-judge panel included Judges Fuentes, Greenberg, and Lourie.
Id.
17. See id. at 208-13.
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change carrier ("LEC")18 and compared narrowband Internet con-
nections, i.e., dial-up connections, 19 with broadband connections,
which primarily include cable modem service and DSL service (the
latter being at issue in this petition).20 He also provided an intro-
duction of facility-based and non-facility-based ISPs and discussed
the ways in which they function.
21
In an overview of the regulatory history in the area of telecom-
munications, Judge Fuentes discussed three key developments
that led to the issuance of the Wireline Broadband Order, includ-
ing the Communications Act of 1934 ("the 1934 Act")22, the FCC's
Computer II ruling23 in 1980, and the Telecommunications Act of
1996.24 By enacting the 1934 Act, Congress gave the Agency the
authority to regulate telephone communications services. 25 Title
II of the 1934 Act, particularly, imposed common carrier 26 obliga-
tions upon local telephone companies.
27
18. Id. at 209. The Supreme Court has described the structure of local exchange as the
following:
a network connecting terminals like telephones, faxes, and modems to other termi-
nals within a geographical area like a city. From terminal network interface devices,
feeder wires, collectively called the "local loop," are run to local switches that aggre-
gate traffic into common "trunks."... Just as the loop runs from terminals to local
switches, the trunks run from the local switches to centralized, or tandem, switches,
originally worked by hand but now by computer, which operate much like railway
switches, directing traffic into other trunks. A signal is sent toward its destination
terminal on these common ways so far as necessary, then routed back down another
hierarchy of switches to the intended telephone or other equipment.
Id. at 209 n.3 (citing Verizon Commc'ns v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 489-90 (2002)). The tele-
phone companies that operate such telephone networks are called Local Exchange Carriers
("LECs"). Id.
19. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 209. With dial-up connections, the end users use a mo-
dem to make calls to the ISP, which will connect them to the Internet. Id. Dial-up is a
slow speed connection. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Telephone companies, i.e., LECs, provide both voice and data services over their
interconnected telephone line system. Id. If LECs provide Internet access to consumers
with their own facilities, they are called "facilities-based ISPs." Id. (citing Brand X, 545
U.S. at 975; Wireline Broadband Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 14858). Independent ISPs, which
lease LECs' wirelines on a wholesale basis to provide Internet service to their customers,
are called "non-facilities-based ISPs." Id.
22. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (1994) (partially amended 1996).
23. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations ("Com-
puter IT'), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
24. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 209.
25. Id. at 210 (citing Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomm., Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 1513, 1516 (2007)).
26. Title II of the 1934 Act regulated the local telephone companies and incorporated
common carrier requirements. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 210 (citing Global Crossing, 127
S. Ct. at 1517). A common carrier is "a commercial enterprise that holds itself out to the
public as offering to transport freight or passengers for a fee," such as a shipowner, a rail-
road, or an airline. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed. 2004). Broadly speaking, tele-
communications, public utilities and other entities that take on a quasi-public character by
Time Warner v. FCC
In addressing the convergence of data processing services and
traditional communications services over wirelines, Computer II
2
established the classification of "basic services," which would be
subject to Title II common carrier regulation, as well as "enhanced
services," which would not be regulated. 29 The primary concern
presented in the consolidated petition was the Computer II ruling
requiring that telephone companies grant their competitors in the
enhanced services market nondiscriminatory access to their wire-
lines. 30 The court proceeded to discuss the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 ("the 1996 Act") that significantly amended the 1934
Act.31 The importance of the 1996 Act for the purpose of these pe-
titions was the classification of both "telecommunications service,"
which is subject to Title II regulation, and "information service,"
which is not regulated by Title 11.32
The next area of background information provided by the court
dealt with the FCC's classification of broadband Internet access
service. 33 The FCC had categorized broadband Internet access
service that is provided via cable modems as an "information ser-
vice" and determined that the Computer II nondiscriminatory ac-
cess requirements did not apply to cable companies despite the
fact that telephone companies were subject to these require-
ments.34 After briefly discussing the procedural background exist-
ing prior to the issuance of the Wireline Broadband Order,35 the
serving for all people indifferently are common carriers. See Global Crossing, 127 S. Ct. at
1516; Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976). A
greater standard of care is required for a common carrier because it serves the public in
general. See Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 210 n.5 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v.
FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
27. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 210.
28. See Computer II, supra note 23.
29. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 211-12. Basic service is limited to the pure transmission,
or movement, of information in any form, voice, data, video, etc., over the telephone net-
work, and does not interact with information supplied by the end users. Id. at 211. En-
hanced service involves the change to the information or the interaction of a subscriber
with stored information. Id. at 211-12.
30. Id. at 212.
31. Id. at 212-13.
32. Id. at 213. The Computer II "basic service" under the 1996 Act terminology is "tele-
communications service," and the "enhance service" is parallel to "information service." Id.
33. Id.
34. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 213. The FCC applied the new classifications in its "Ca-
ble Modem Declaratory Ruling." Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet
Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002).
35. In 2002, before the release of Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, the FCC issued a
notice of the proposed rulemaking on wireline broadband service and requested public
comments on several tentative rulings concerning the classification of such service. Time
Warner, 507 F.3d at 214.
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court summarized the two principal rulings of the Wireline Broad-
band Order: (1) wireline broadband Internet access service was
classified as an "information service"-just like cable broadband
service; and (2) the Computer 11 requirements of nondiscrimina-
tory access no longer applied to LECs.
36
The court then advanced its discussion to the two rulings that
had been challenged by the petitioners.3 7 First, it discussed the
FCC's classification of wireline broadband Internet access service
as an "information service," rather than as a "telecommunication
service,"38 and concluded that the Agency's determination was
based upon a reasonable interpretation of the 1934 Act, as it was
then codified ("the Communications Act"). 39 After referencing the
statutory definitions of the two terms,40 the court cited the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in National Cable & Telecommu-
nication Association v. Brand X Internet Services41 ("Brand X').42
Brand X upheld the FCC's conclusion that cable modem broad-
band Internet service is not a telecommunications service; rather,
it provides consumers with information service in the form of
Internet access-a service that is accomplished via telecommuni-
cations.43 The majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the
FCC's argument in the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling 4 that,
from the end users' perception, the cable broadband services they
receive are integrated, and the Court concluded that the transmis-
sion component of the services is integrated with the data process-
ing component and is not a separate and an additionally offered
service. 45 The court in Time Warner acknowledged that the FCC
had applied the same analysis in the Wireline Broadband Order
36. Id. at 214.
37. Id. at 215.
38. Id. (citing Wireline Broadband Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 14862).
39. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 215. The Communications Act of 1934 has been codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2006).
40. Id. at 214. "[Telecommunications means the transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user's own choosing, without change in
the form or content of the information as sent and received." 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). "The
term telecommunications service means the offering of telecommunications for a fee di-
rectly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the
public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. § 153(46). "The term information ser-
vice means 'the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications..
." 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
41. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
42. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 215.
43. Id. at 216 (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 989).
44. 17 F.C.C.R. at 4823.
45, Time Warner. 507 F.3d at 216.
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as the Supreme Court did in its Brand X decision and concluded
that wireline broadband Internet access is an integrated informa-
tion service.
46
Petitioners agreed that the Internet service component of the
wireline broadband service is an unregulated "information ser-
vice"; however, they insisted that the wireline transmission com-
ponent of the service is a "telecommunication service" regulated by
Title II of the Communications Act.4 7 The petitioners raised three
arguments in support of their position: (1) the FCC's classification
of wireline broadband service was not supported by record evi-
dence; (2) the ruling was contrary to the FCC's past rulings; and
(3) this classification of wireline broadband was not consistent
with the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
48
("CALEA"). 49 The court addressed and rejected each of these three
arguments.
50
The Agency's argument in support of its own position was that
from the perspective of the end users, both wireline broadband
service and cable modem service are functionally similar and, ac-
cordingly, each should be subject to the same classification under
the Communications Act.5 1 By reviewing the records of public
comments submitted in response to the Wireline Broadband
NPRM,52 the court found that the FCC's conclusion was supported
by record evidence. 53 Petitioners then argued that wireline broad-
band service is distinguishable from cable modem service because
the telephone companies (i.e., LECs) provide their wireline trans-
mission capacities to independent ISPs on a "stand-alone" basis,
i.e., the ISPs only lease telephone lines from LECs for transmis-
sion purposes while providing their consumers with their own
46. Id. at 217 (citing 20 F.C.C.R. at 14863).
47. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 217.
48. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-02.
49. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 217.
50. Id. at 217-20.
51. Id. at 217.
52. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. See 70 Fed. Reg. 60259-01 (Oct. 17, 2005).
53. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 217-18. The court quoted comments from Verizon and
Qwest, which stated, among other things, that Cable modem and DSL are "functionally
similar" and "unlike traditional dial-up connections, each enables consumers to use their
ordinary telephone line for voice or fax while simultaneously accessing the Internet;" that
providers of cable modem and DSL "view them as substitutes;" that DSL and Cable modem
are "[a]nalogous" in that functions provided to the end user are the same, that service set
up processes are "functionally identical," that all data is "packetized," that IP addresses are
"assigned to the Premise in the same manner," that the end user's computer can be used
"interchangeably," etc.; that consumers view them as "interchangeable," with "little differ-
ence" between perceptions among potential subscribers of either services." Id.
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Internet access service. 54 The court was not convinced by this ar-
gument and pointed out that LECs, as broadband providers, made
their facilities accessible on a "stand-alone" basis solely because
they are required to do so by Computer II.55 The court noted that
the very purpose of the Wireline Broadband Order was to elimi-
nate these requirements. 56 The court found that record evidence
disclosed that the cable modem companies possessed the capacity
to provide transmission service to other ISPs on a "stand-alone"
basis and that they had already done so.5 This evidence, how-
ever, did not prevent the Supreme Court from affirming the FCC's
conclusion that cable modem broadband is an integrated informa-
tion service. 58 The Third Circuit, therefore, was unwilling to de-
cide the question differently.
59
The court also found unpersuasive the petitioners' argument
that the FCC's classification of broadband Internet access was im-
proper because it conflicted with past Agency rulings. 60 The FCC
contended that even if conflicting decisions existed, a sufficient
number of supportive prior rulings established the Agency's cur-
rent classification of wireline broadband Internet access service as
an information service. 61 The court cited Brand X in support of
the FCC's contention that even though conflicts may exist, it does
not necessarily follow that the classification provided by the order
at issue is arbitrary and capricious.6 2 The Supreme Court, in
Brand X, stated that "[a]n initial agency interpretation is not in-
stantly carved in stone"63 -i.e., the Agency must be free to con-
sider varying interpretations and be free to revise its policy on a
continuous basis.6 4 Consequently, the Third Circuit did not find
54. Id. at 218.
55. Id. (citing Wireline Broadband Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 14886). LECs are actually the
only broadband providers subject to these Computer H requirements. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 218 (citing Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4828-31).
58. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 218.
59. Id. at 218-19.
60. Id. at 219. For example, the current ruling is contradictory to the FCC's conclusion
in Advance Services Order that broadband Internet access consisted of both an information
service and a telecommunications service. In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering
Advanced Telecommunications Capability ("Advance Services Order"), 13 F.C.C.R. 24012,
23017-18 (1998).
61. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 219 (citing 20 F.C.C.R. at 14862). For example, the FCC
relied on its conclusion in the Universal Service Report, that "the categories of 'information
service' and 'telecommunications service' are mutually exclusive." Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service ("Universal Service Report"), 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11519 (1998).
62. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 219 (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 978).
63. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981
64. Id. (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981).
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that the past conflicting rulings rendered the current classification
unreasonable.
6 5
The court treated petitioners' third argument on the classifica-
tion issue, which employed the CALEA66 statute, as a "red her-
ring."67 Petitioners argued that the FCC's classification of wire-
line broadband was arbitrary and capricious because it conflicted
with the Agency's ruling in its CALEA Order68-that "broadband
services are hybrid telecommunications-information services sub-
ject to the statute. '69 The court found the argument unsound be-
cause: (1) CALEA had a completely different legislative history
and purpose; (2) the act used the term "telecommunications carri-
ers," not "telecommunication service"; and (3) the structure of
CALEA was different, which indicated that Congress did not in-
tend that the terms "telecommunications carrier" and "informa-
tion service" be mutually exclusive. 70 The court acknowledged
that the FCC possesses the discretion to interpret two statutes
differently and rejected petitioners' argument.
71
The second challenge brought by petitioners charged that the
FCC's decision to relieve all LECs from the obligation to provide
nondiscriminatory access, as required by Computer II, was arbi-
trary and capricious. 72 Petitioners objected to this decision with
three arguments: (1) the FCC did not conduct a proper market
analysis; (2) the FCC did not properly apply the NARUC I com-
mon carrier test;73 and (3) the FCC order violated the discontinu-
65. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 219.
66. CALEA was enacted in 1994 to require telecommunications carriers to ensure that
law enforcement officials could access their network. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 219 (citing
Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
67. Id. at 219. "Red herring" is defined as an "irrelevant legal or factual issue, usu.
intended to distract or mislead." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (8th ed. 2004).
68. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement and Broadband Access and Ser-
vices ("CALEA Order"), 20 F.C.C.R. 14989 (2005).
69. Id. at 219 (citing CALEA Order at 14998-99). CALEA applies only to "telecommu-
nication carriers," not "information service providers." Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 219.
70. Id. at 219. CALEA created three categories for purposes of identifying the commu-
nication services that are subject to the statute: "pure telecommunications service," "pure
information service," and "hybrid telecommunications-information service." Id. (citing
CALEA Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 14989, 14998-99). Only pure information service is not sub-
ject to the statute. Id.
71. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 220 (citing Am. Council, 451 F.3d at 232-33).
72. Id. at 220.
73. The test was set in Natl Assoc. of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC ("NARUC"),
525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 220. Under the test, "a car-
rier has to be regulated as a common carrier if it will make capacity available to the public
indifferently or if the public interest requires common carrier operation of the proposed
facility." Id. at 222 (citing Virgin Islands Tel. Corp. v. FCC ('Vitelco"), 198 F.3d 921, 924
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted)).
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ance requirements of section 214 of the Communications Act,74 as
well as the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment 75 of
the United States Constitution.7 6 The court dismissed all three
arguments as unpersuasive. 7
Petitioners argued that the FCC should be required to follow its
well-established policy and past practice for assessing Title II
LECs' market power.78 Specifically, they contended that before
the FCC could relieve the LECs of the Computer II requirements,
the Agency should be required to conduct a traditional market
analysis with respect to the markets in which LECs were domi-
nant.7 9 The FCC reasoned that a traditional market analysis had
been applied to the conventional telephone services market, which
had been mature and stable for more than twenty years.8 0 By con-
trast, the FCC characterized the broadband service market as
emerging, dynamic, and rapidly changing and argued that any
conclusion with respect to such a market, from a standard market
dominance analysis would be premature.81 For these reasons, the
Agency contended that it was justified in basing its decision on a
prediction of the future trend in the broadband service market.8 2
The court refused to challenge the FCC's prediction and found
that the Agency's decision to change the course of practice with
respect to the market analysis was reasonable and justifiable.8 3
The court also rejected petitioners' argument that the FCC had
failed to consider the public interest as set forth in the NARUC I
test, even though the Computer II requirements had been elimi-
74. According to § 214 of the Communications Act, a common carrier may not discon-
tinue service, unless it first obtains from the FCC a "certificate that neither the present nor
future public convenience and necessity will be adversely affected thereby." Time Warner,
507 F.3d at 223 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 214(a)).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
76. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 220.
77. Id. at 220-23.
78. Id. at 220 (citing Brief for Time Warner at 29, Time Warner Telecom Inc. v. F.C.C.,
No. 054769 (3d. Cir. Oct. 16, 2007)).
79. Id. Such markets included business market and certain geographic markets. Id.
Petitioners conceded that cable modem broadband providers were certainly dominant in the
residential market. Id. n.ll.
80. Id. at 221.
81. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 221. See Wireline Broadband Order, 20 F.C.C.R at
14898.
82. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 221. The FCC projected that the market penetration, as
well as the demand for broadband services will increase dramatically. Id. (citing Wireline
Broadband Order, 20 F.C.C.R at 14884-85).
83. Id. The court reached its conclusion based on a well-settled standard that "an
agency may change its course [from past practice] so long as it can justify its change with a
'reasoned analysis."' Id. (citing Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2004)).
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nated from the LECs.8 4 According to the FCC, the elimination of
the nondiscriminatory access requirement on LECs would give
those telephone companies greater incentive to invest in and de-
ploy new technologies, and the independent ISPs would continue
to enjoy reasonable access to LECs' facilities because it would be
in the interest of the carriers to make their facilities available at
reasonable prices to competing ISPs.8 5 The FCC argued that, in so
doing, the Title II LECs could spread the infrastructure costs of
their networks over as many customers as possible.8 6 The court
also held that the FCC's judgment providing that the public inter-
est would be best served by deregulation of wireline broadband
providers under Computer II was entitled to "substantial judicial
deference. 87 Petitioners' argument that Section 214 of the Com-
munications Act had been violated was also rejected because the
court found that the FCC properly considered the public interest
before rescinding the Computer II requirements.88 With respect to
the Due Process argument, the court found that the FCC had im-
posed sufficient safeguards on the LECs (a one year transition
period, advance notice, etc.) to protect the independent ISPs' and
consumers' Due Process rights.
8 9
By rejecting the petitioners' several arguments, the court con-
cluded that the Wireline Broadband Order was based on a reason-
able interpretation of the Communications Act, held that the FCC
had not abused its discretion, and denied the petition for review.90
II. THE HISTORY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
A. Communications Act of 1934-The Beginning of Regulation
The issue in this case can be traced back to the Communications
Act of 1934. 91 The FCC was created by the 1934 Act to regulate
84. Id. at 222.
85. Id. (citing Wireline Broadband Order, 20 F.C.C.R at 14887-94).
86. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 222 (citing Wireline Broadband Order, 20 F.C.C.R at
14893).
87. Id. It has been well-settled that the task of weighing of policies under public inter-
est standard has been delegated to the Commission. Id. (citing WNCN Listeners Guild,
450 U.S. at 596, 101).
88. Id. at 223.
89. Id. The FCC order required that the LECs continue to "honor existing transmission
arrangements with their current ISP or other customers," and the LECs were also required
to provide advance notice before discontinuing any services. Id. (citing Wireline Broadband
Order, 20 F.C.C.R at 14905-08).
90. Id.
91. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 209-10.
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interstate and international communication by wire and radio (Ti-
tle I jurisdiction). 92 Title II of the 1934 Act afforded the FCC
broad authority to regulate telecommunications services. 93 Tele-
phone companies, as common carriers, were required to charge
their customers "just and reasonable rates," and the FCC was
given the power to set rates if the rates charged by these carriers
were considered by the Agency to be unjust or unreasonable.
94
B. The Computer Inquiries Rulings-Deregulation of Enhanced
Services
With the development of computer technologies, regulated con-
ventional telephone communications were increasingly used for
data processing services. 95 The concern was that if Title II tele-
phone companies were allowed to provide data services without
clear regulatory safeguards, the carriers might fail to provide ade-
quate communications services at reasonable and nondiscrimina-
tory rates, and effective competition in data processing services
market might be impaired.96 In order to address the issues pre-
sented by such a confluence, the FCC initiated the Computer In-
quiry proceedings. 97 Over the years, the Agency has issued three
different rulings on this matter, i.e., "Computer I," "Computer II,"
and "Computer III.' '98 Computer I, which was finalized in 1971,
required maximum separation of the regulated telephone commu-
nications services and the non-regulated data services. 99 Accord-
ing to Computer I, Title II common carriers were allowed to pro-
92. Communications Act, ch. 652, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1934)). Title I of the Act created the FCC and defined its jurisdiction: "[flor
the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and
radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States...
there is hereby created a commission to be known as the 'Federal Communications Com-
mission'...." Id.
93. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 210 (citing Global Crossing, 127 S. Ct. at 1516).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 210.
96. Id. at 210-11. The FCC was concerned about "the alleged ability of common carri-
ers to favor their own data processing activities by discriminatory services, cross-
subsidization, improper pricing of common carrier services, and related anticompetitive
practices and activities." Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdepend-
ence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, Final Decision and Order
("Computer 1"), 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270 (1971).
97. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 210.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 211. In Computer I, the FCC determined, among other things, that the 1934
Act did not require the FCC to extend its regulatory jurisdiction to data processing services.
Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 267.
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vide data services strictly through fully separate subsidiaries hav-
ing separate accounts, separate personnel, separate equipment,
and separate facilities. 100 In addition, Computer I prohibited the
telephone companies from contracting with their subsidiaries for
data processing services to prevent discriminatory conduct by the
dominant carriers. 10' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the FCC's broad authority under the Communications
Act to regulate both computer and data processing services and
upheld the Computer I order.
10 2
Computer H was issued in 1980 to address the increasing diffi-
culty of distinguishing traditional telecommunications services
and data processing services due to the rapid development of
technologies. 10 3 Remote terminals had formerly been used to
communicate with mainframe computers in centralized locations,
and these services had been classified as "pure communica-
tions."'0 4  Those "dumb" terminals, however, had now been re-
placed by "smart" microcomputers capable of manipulating and
processing data. 0 5 The result was the presence of "intelligence"
on both ends of the wirelines. 0 6 The FCC's resolution of this issue
was the dichotomy of basic and enhanced services, each of which
were defined based on the end user's perspective on how the ser-
vice was offered. 0 7 This classification established the division
between the common carrier transmission services from these
computer services that depend on the telephone company's ser-
vices in transmitting information. 08 Examples of basic services,
or "pure" or "transparent" transmission, include both telephone
and facsimile (fax) communications. 10 9 "Enhanced services," as
determined by the FCC, include, among other things, e-mail, the
100. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 211.
101. Computer 1, 28 F.C.C.2d 267.
102. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973). The court acknowledged that
the federal courts "have uniformly and consistently interpreted the Act to give the Commis-
sion broad and comprehensive rule-making authority in the new and dynamic field of elec-
tronic communication." Id. at 730-31 (citing NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219
(1943)). The court held that the expansive power of the FCC includes "the jurisdictional
authority to regulate carrier activities in an area as intimately related to the communica-
tions industry as that of computer services, where such activities may substantially affect
the efficient provision of reasonably priced communications service." Id. at 731.
103. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 211.
104. Id. See Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Enlargement of Proposed Rulemaking
("Computer II Supplemental Notice of Inquiry"), 64 F.C.C.2d 771 (1977).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976.
108. Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384.
109. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976.
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World Wide Web, newsgroups, and voice mail. 110 The significance
of this classification is that "basic service" is subject to the Title II
common carrier regulation.111 "Enhanced service," on the other
hand, even when offered via wirelines, is not subject to common
carrier regulation. 
112
Moreover, Computer II eliminated the strict maximum separa-
tion requirement imposed upon all telephone common carriers,
except for those assets controlled by the two dominant carriers,
AT&T and GTE. 1' 3 As a result, telephone companies were allowed
to provide enhanced services without creating subsidiaries. 114
These facility-based providers were still required to grant inde-
pendent competing providers nondiscriminatory access to their
wirelines due to the concern that these telephone companies had
monopoly powers because they owned the local exchange facili-
ties.115 The D.C. Circuit upheld the Computer 11 ruling on ap-
peal.1 16 The court affirmed the FCC's underlying market power
analysis and found that the Agency's view regarding its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate non-Title II activities (i.e., en-
hanced service) was reasonable. 17
The FCC issued the third Computer Inquiry proceeding, or
Computer III, in 1986.118 The dominant telephone companies, or
110. Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's Computer
Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 188 (2003).
111. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 976-77 (citing Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 420).
112. Id.
113. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 212. According to the FCC's assessment, AT&T and GTE
were two dominant carriers that had sufficient market power to engage in "anticompetitive
activity" on a large scale. Id. (citing Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384). AT&T and its Bell
System functioned as natural monopoly in telephone market prior to the divestiture of
AT&T in 1984 as a result of a government antitrust lawsuit. See United States v. AT&T,
552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983).
114. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996 (citing Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384). This was not a
Title II requirement and the FCC claimed ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the Com-
munications Act in making the ruling. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 212; see 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
61.
115. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996 (citing Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384). Local exchange
and toll transmission facilities are also referred to as "bottleneck." Computer II, 77
F.C.C.2d 384. See supra note 18 (describing the physical structure of a local telephone
exchange).
116. Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n v. FCC ("Computer"), 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
117. Computer, 693 F.2d at 211-12. See supra note 114.
118. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier
Services and Facilities Authorizations ("Computer IPr), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986).
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Bell operating companies ("BOCs"), 119 were no longer required to
use the costly separate subsidiaries to provide enhanced ser-
vices. 120 The FCC, however, sought to address its original con-
cerns regarding anticompetitive behavior by establishing non-
structural safeguards. 121 The Agency's short-term solution to the
problem was a scheme it called Comparatively Efficient Intercon-
nection ("CEI"); the long-term solution was called Open Network
Architecture ("ONA"). 122 Under CEI, a BOC was required to make
all of the same provisions it afforded to its affiliated enhanced ser-
vice provider ("ESP") to independent ESPs on the same terms and
conditions. 23 ONA would require BOCs to break their telephone
networks into blocks (lines, switches, call forwarding, call waiting,
accounting, billing, etc.) so that the ESPs could selectively pur-
chase these unbundled services and reassemble them into new
and innovative services. 124 Computer III was reviewed by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the ONA rules were
vacated and remanded to the FCC. 125 That court held that the
FCC had failed to adequately explain how the non-structured
safeguards of Computer III were sufficient to prevent access dis-
crimination. 1
26
Computer networks were the direct beneficiaries of the Com-
puter Inquiries, and the safeguards imposed upon common carri-
ers by the rulings were considered to be for the benefit of com-
puter networks. 27 After Computer III, the first commercial ISP
was established in 1989, and the World Wide Web became a real-
119. After the divestiture of AT&T in 1984, twenty-two Bell operating companies
("BOCs"), which had been AT&T's wholly owned subsidiaries providing local exchange
service, split from AT&T, and were grouped into seven holding companies known collec-
tively as the regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs). See 74 AM. JUR. 2D Telecommu-
nications § 27; AT&T: History: The Bell System,
http://www.corp.att.com/history/history3.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
120. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 212.
121. Cannon, supra note 110, at 200.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision
of Enhanced Servs., Order ("Computer III Order on Reconsideration"), 14 F.C.C.R. 21628
(1999).
124. Cannon, supra note 110, at 201 (citing Computer III Further Remand Proceedings:
Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
("Computer III Further Notice"), 13 F.C.C.R. 6040 (1998)).
125. Cannon, supra note 110, at 202 (citing California v. FCC ("California"), 39 F.3d 919
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1994)).
126. California, 39 F.3d at 930.
127. Cannon, supra note 110, at 169.
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ity in 1991.128 By the mid-1990s, the number of Internet users
had virtually exploded. 129
C. Telecommunications Act of 1996-Telecommunications Ser-
vice vs. Information Service
In 1996, Congress overhauled telecommunications law for the
first time since passing the 1934 Act by enacting the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996.130 Title II of the 1934 Act was amended to
address the issue of market dominance by a small number of
LECs.131 Particularly, Title II now imposed on "incumbent local
exchange carriers" ("ILECs")132 a duty to interconnect with other
telecommunications carriers and set forth the requirements they
must meet to fulfill the duty. 133 For example, ILECs are required
to permit nondiscriminatory interconnection; to provide any other
carrier unbundled access to the ILEC's network at cost-based
rates; to charge customers just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
rates; and to contribute to the federal "Universal Service Fund."134
The 1996 Act codified Computer II basic service and enhanced
service as telecommunications service and information service,
respectively. 135 Title II of the amended 1934 Act regulates tele-
communications carriers as common carriers, but information ser-
vice providers are not so regulated. 136 The 1996 Act also requires
the FCC to forbear from imposing one of its regulations on tele-
communications carriers if it should determine that the particular
regulation is not necessary to safeguard public interest.137 How-
128. Id. at 204.
129. Id.
130. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 212.
131. Id. (citing James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile? A Critique of
Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 63 (2000)).
132. ILECs refer to any LEC existing as of the date of passage of the 1996 Act. Id. They
are the former monopoly local telephone companies, mainly BOCs, while the new players in
the local market, such as start-up carriers, cable companies, utility companies, wireless
carriers, etc., are called competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs"). Richard E. Wiley et
al., Communications Law 2007, 920 PLI/Pat 249, 286 (2007).
133. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 213 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 251); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975
(citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-09, 254).
134. Id. The "Universal Service Fund" is used to subsidize telecommunications and
information services in rural and high-cost areas, as well as for schools, libraries, and low-
income households. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3), (h)(1)(B). The Communications Act mandates
contributions from "[e]very telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecom-
munications services." Id. § 254(d).
135. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 213. For the Act definitions of "information service" and
"telecommunication service," see supra note 40.
136. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 975.
137. Id. at 976 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 160).
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ever, the FCC retained its jurisdiction to impose additional regu-
lations on information service providers under its Title I ancillary
jurisdiction 138
In implementing the 1996 Act, the FCC issued Universal Ser-
vice Order13 9 in 1997.140 In the following year, the Agency submit-
ted a report to Congress ("the Universal Service Report")141 review-
ing its implementation of the universal service provisions of the
1996 Act. 142 In the Universal Service Report, the FCC concluded
that the categories of "telecommunications service" and "informa-
tion service" in the 1996 Act are mutually exclusive and are con-
sistent with the preexisting Computer H definitions of "basic ser-
vice" and "enhanced service."'143 The FCC viewed the provision of
transmission capacity to ISPs as "telecommunications service" and
as a result, telephone companies offering leased lines to ISPs be-
came subject to Title II universal service regulation. 144 The report
found, however, that non-facility-based ISPs, which lease lines
from telecommunications carriers for the sole purpose of trans-
porting data, provide information services; thus, they are not sub-
ject to Title II regulation. 145 In late 1998, the FCC ruled that
ILECs' digital subscriber line ("DSL") services, which are used by
ISPs to provide high-speed Internet access to consumers, should
be classified as interstate telecommunications services and there-
fore should be subject to the federal regulation.
146
138. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-61).
139. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Serv., Report and Order ('Universal Ser-
vice Order"), 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997).
140. Id. In the Universal Service section of the 1996 Act, Congress directed the FCC to
establish mechanism to ensure "[c]onsumers in all regions of the Nation, including . . .
those in rural, insular, and high cost areas . . . have access to telecommunications and
information services... at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for simi-
lar services in urban areas." Id. at 8799 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 254).
141. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Rep. to Cong. ("Universal Service
Report"), 13 F.C.C.R. 11501 (1998).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 11507.
144. Id. at 11533.
145. Id. at 11532-33. The Agency found that Congress intended to keep information
service providers from being subject to regulation as common carriers simply because they
provide their services via telecommunications. Id. at 11508.
146. Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet (Federal Communica-
tions Commission OPP Working Paper No. 31, 1999) (citing GTE Telephone Operating
Companies Tariff No. 1, 13 F.C.C.R. 22466 (1998)). DSL services can give consumers abil-




D. Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling-Deregulation of Cable
Internet Access
While more than thirty years have passed since the FCC's first
Computer Inquiry proceeding, the convergence of technologies has
presented even greater challenges to the Agency in regulating the
communications market. 147 By way of example, not only can data
communications now be offered over traditional voice lines, voice
services can also be offered as a type of data service; 148 not only
can cable companies offer video programs, they are also capable of
offering data and voice services over traditional television facili-
ties. 149 The ever-increasing blurring of the distinction between
information and telecommunications services has made it difficult
for the FCC to assign services into these mutually exclusive cate-
gories and thereby keep data services unregulated.
150
The issue of whether cable companies should be required to pro-
vide ISPs with access to their broadband system was first ad-
dressed by the FCC in 1998 in its "First Section 706 Inquiry,"
which dealt with the deployment of broadband capability. 151 In
2002, after two years of a rulemaking proceeding, the FCC issued
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and therein concluded that cable
modem broadband Internet access service is an "information ser-
vice" and is, therefore, not subject to the Title II regulations.
152
The Agency found no basis to treat cable companies differently
from non-facilities-based ISPs, which were classified as solely in-
formation service providers, despite the fact that cable companies
actually own the facilities they use to provide Internet access.
153
The FCC reasoned that cable companies, like non-facilities-based
ISPs, do not offer telecommunications directly to the end user; but,
147. Oxman, supra note 146, at 26.
148. Id. at 22, 26.
149. Id.
150. Id. See also Rob Frieden, Neither Fish Nor Fowl: New Strategies for Selective Regu-
lation of Information Services, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 373, 376 (2008).
151. Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4799. See Inquiry Concerning the
Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable
and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Sec-
tion 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report ("First Section 706 Report"), 14
F.C.C.R. 2398, 2449 (1999).
152. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 978. The FCC relied heavily on the Universal Service Report
in reaching this conclusion. Id. (citing Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at
4821-22).
153. Id. Non-facility-based ISPs were classified as sole information service provider in
the Universal Service Report. Id. (citing Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at
4823; Universal Service Report, 13 F.C.C.R. at 11533).
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rather, they use the underlying telecommunications to provide end
users with Internet access, a service that was considered to be an
information service.
54
E. Brand X-Judicial Review of Cable Modem Declaratory Rul-
ing
The Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling triggered numerous peti-
tions for judicial review, all aimed at the FCC's conclusion that
cable modem Internet access was not a telecommunications ser-
vice. 155 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was selected to
review these petitions by judicial lottery. 156 The court vacated
that portion of the ruling that concluded that cable modem service
was not a "telecommunications service" and held that such a con-
clusion represented an impermissible construction of the Commu-
nications Act. 157 The court based its holding on a Ninth Circuit
precedent, 158 providing that cable modem service was a "telecom-
munications service," and concluded that the precedential holding
overrode the contrary interpretation of the Communications Act
that had been made by the FCC in Cable Modem Declaratory Rul-
ing.1
59
In Brand X, the United States Supreme Court rejected the rea-
soning of the Ninth Circuit and stated that a prior judicial con-
struction of a statute may trump an agency's construction only if
the terms of the statute are unambiguous and leave no room for
154. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979 (citing Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at
4824; Universal Service Report 13 F.C.C.R. at 11539-40). The FCC concluded that because
the Internet access service enables users to manipulate and store information, it was an
information service. Id. at 978 (citing 17 F.C.C.R. at 4824).
155. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979. Seven different petitions were filed in the Third, Ninth,
and District of Columbia Circuits. Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1127
(9th Cir. 2003). All the petitioners agreed that cable modem service is an information ser-
vice, but advocated for the FCC to make an additional determination. Brand X, 345 F.3d at
1127. For example, one group of petitioners, argued that cable modem service is both in-
formation and telecommunications services, and therefore, should be subject to Title II
regulation and should be required to provide access to the competing ISPs. Id. at 1127, nn.
10, 11.
156. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979. When an agency receives petitions to review with respect
to an order in more than one courts of appeals, the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
is authorized to designate one of these courts of appeals, by means of random selection, to
review the consolidated petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3).
157. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 979 (citing Brand X, 345 F.3d at 1132).
158. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland ("Portland"), 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
159. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979-80 (citing Portland, 216 F.3d at 877-80; Brand X, 345
F.3d at 1128-32). The issue of that case did not concern any FCC proceeding; but the court,
nevertheless, followed precedent. Id. at 980.
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an agency's use of its discretion. 160 The Court concluded that the
Chevron framework governing judicial review of an agency's rul-
ing should be applied to the FCC's interpretation of the term "tele-
communications service." 161 The Court found this term to be am-
biguous because the statute does not clearly state whether the
telecommunications component of the cable Internet access is
functionally integrated in, or separated from the cable modem
service and, consequently, that the Chevron standard requires a
federal court to accept the construction of the term as provided by
the FCC-the agency designated by Congress to implement the
statute-as long as its construction is reasonable.162 The majority
of the Court deferred to the FCC's conclusion in this "technical"
and "complex" area and held as "reasonable" the FCC's ruling that
cable modem service is not both a telecommunications service and
an information service, but rather, an integrated information ser-
vice. 163 The majority used an interesting "car dealership" analogy
to illustrate this conclusion. 164 In a dissenting opinion, however,
Justice Scalia challenged the majority with a competing analogy
(a pizza delivery service) to argue that the transmission compo-
nent is a service that is separate from the cable modem service. 165
He characterized the FCC's interpretation as unlawful and criti-
cized the FCC's heavy reliance on its Title I ancillary jurisdiction
to change regulations in whatever way it considered necessary.
166
160. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.
161. Id. at 981. The Chevron framework is a two-step procedure. Id. at 986. At step
one, a court will determine whether the statute's plain language directly addresses the
precise question at issue; if the statute is ambiguous on the point, the court proceeds to step
two to determine whether the agency's construction is "a reasonable policy choice for the
agency to make." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843,
845 (1984).
162. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981, 992, 997. On remand for further proceedings, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling. Brand X
Internet Services v. FCC, 435 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2006).
163. Id. at 992.
164. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 990. In this illustration, the majority stated that while it
might be said that a car dealer offers cars for sale, it would not be said that the dealer
offers for sale the essential integrated parts that make the car valuable, for e.g., the engine;
in fact, it would seem very odd to say that a dealer offers such components for sale in addi-
tion to the car itself. Id.
165. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1007 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Souter and Ginsburg, argued that a pizzeria could not say that it offered pizza and brought
it to the customer's home, but did not offer delivery since delivery was an integrated part of
its service. Id.
166. Id. at 1005, 1014 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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F. Wireline Broadband Order-Deregulation of DSL Services
Three months after the Supreme Court's endorsement of its
classification of cable modem Internet access as an information
service, the FCC, in its Wireline Broadband Order, reclassified
DSL service from telecommunications service to information ser-
vice. 167 The Wireline Broadband Order relieved all LECs of obli-
gations imposed by Computer Inquiries with respect to wireline
broadband Internet access services. 168 Unlike cable lines that
were originally used for TV programming transmission, wirelines
had been traditionally used exclusively for the Title II regulated
telecommunications services. 169 The FCC failed to explain how
the telecommunications component of DSL service had changed
from a stand-alone service to an integrated component but simply
employed a rationale similar to the one used when declaring cable
modem service an unseverable information service, in order to
reach regulatory parity between cable modem and DSL services. 170
G. Extension of Deregulation to Other Broadband Services
In pursuing the goal of creating a consistent regulatory frame-
work for various broadband platforms, the FCC extended the rul-
ing of Wireline Broadband Order to other forms of broadband ser-
vices. 171 In 2006, the FCC, in its BPL-Enabled Internet Order,
classified broadband over power line ("BPL")-enabled Internet ac-
cess service as an information service. 172 In 2007, the FCC re-
leased Wireless Internet Order173 and classified wireless broadband
Internet access service as an information service regardless of the
type of technology (mobile, portable, or fixed) that is employed to
offer the service. 174 The FCC, however, has been reluctant to
make a determination on the classification of the Voice over Inter-
167. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 214 (citing 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14862-66).
168. 20 F.C.C.R. at 14858.
169. Frieden, supra note 150, at 387.
170. Id. at 387-88.
171. John Nakahata, et, al., Developments in VoIP and Broadband Regulation 2007, 920
PLI/Pat 193, 231 (2007) (citing Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to
the Internet Over Wireless Networks ("Wireless Internet Order"), 22 F.C.C.R. 5901, 5904
(2007)).
172. Id. (citing United Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding
the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information
Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order ("BPL-Enabled Internet Order"), 21 F.C.C.R.
13281 (2006)).
173. See Wireless Internet Order, supra note 171.




net Protocol ("VoIP") service. 175 Nevertheless, by invoking its Title
I ancillary jurisdiction, the Agency issued an order 176 in 2006 re-
quiring "interconnected" VoIP service providers to contribute to
the Universal Service Fund and thereby made VoIP subject to the
same regulations as common carriers. 177 This decision was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia using
the Chevron two-part test.
178
III. EVALUATING THE TIME WARNER HOLDING
Judging from the evolution of regulatory history and the devel-
opment of case law, particularly the Supreme Court's holding in
Brand Xthe decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Time Warner was both reasonable and predictable in that the
court closely followed existing precedent. The FCC's argument in
support of its Wireline Broadband Order that the policy of further
deregulation would help promote competition in the broadband
markets, however, does not square with either reality or the exist-
ing statistical data, even though the FCC's deregulation policy in
1980s and 1990s was beneficial to the development of the Internet.
Congress, through the 1996 Act, afforded the FCC all necessary
power to expand its deregulation policy. Courts, on the other
hand, probably have been too deferential to the FCC's exercise of
its discretion to legitimately claim effective judicial oversight of
the Agency.
The court's decision in Time Warner in upholding the FCC's
Wireline Broadband Order was predictable. The United States
175. Vonage Holdings Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Frieden, su-
pra note 150, at 392. VoIP service provides packet-switched communications that require
the processing of bit-streams originated and terminated over DSL or cable lines. Frieden,
supra note 150, at 392. See also Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 574 (8th
Cir. 2007) (describing the difference between packet-switched and circuit-switched commu-
nications). It offers "multidirectional voice functionality," including services similar to
traditional telephony. Vonage, 489 F.3d at 1235 (citing IP-Enabled Services ("IP-Enabled
Service"), 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4866 (2004)).
176. Universal Serv. Contribution Methodology, Report and Order and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking ("Contribution Methodology"), 21 F.C.C.R. 7518 (2006). See Frieden,
supra note 150, at 392.
177. Vonage, 489 F.3d at 1236 (citing Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692-93
(D.C. Cir. 2005)). Interconnected VoIP service is defined as a service that:
(1) enables real-time, two-way voice communications; (2) requires a broadband con-
nection from the user's location; (3) requires Internet protocol-compatible customer
premises equipment (CPE); and (4) permits users generally to receive calls that
originate on the public switched telephone network and to terminate calls to the pub-
lic switched telephone network.
47 C.F.R. § 9.3 (2005).
178. Frieden, supra note 150, at 399 (citing Vonage, 489 F.3d at 1239-41).
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Supreme Court in Brand X recently endorsed the FCC's order in
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling in which the Agency classified
cable broadband Internet service-a service that reasonably and
sufficiently resembles the wireline broadband Internet service-as
a deregulated information service. 179 While the Court's holding in
Brand X is controversial and features Justice Scalia's strong dis-
senting opinion in which two other Justices joined, 180 it is not sur-
prising that the Third Circuit followed precedent and endorsed the
FCC's deregulation order regarding the wireline broadband ser-
vice. The court in Time Warner followed the Supreme Court's
model by using Chevron's reasonable standard of review and also
adopted the Court's disposition to give the FCC all due deference
in areas of its apparent expertise. 181 The court, however, did not
challenge the FCC's discretion in making conflicting rulings, in
interpreting two statutes differently, or in changing its market
analysis approach. 8 2 Rather, the court chose to take a reasonable
and safe approach; thus, its holding in Time Warner was a "safe"
decision.
Whether the FCC's arguments in support of its rulings were
sound and reasonable is a different story, and whether these rul-
ings have accomplished the goal of promoting competition in the
broadband markets is open to question. The FCC's late twentieth
century policy was helpful to Internet development. The series of
Computer Inquiry proceedings that were promulgated by the FCC
to benefit the computer networks, have, to a certain extent, ful-
filled their mission. By creating the dichotomy of enhanced ser-
vice and basic service, the Agency has allowed the computer net-
works to develop and flourish in two different ways. 183 On the one
hand, the Computer Inquiries made it possible for the Internet to
grow in an unregulated environment as an enhanced service.
8 4
On the other hand, the transmission services underlying Internet
service remained regulated as a basic service; thus, hundreds of
ISPs were able to offer affordable Internet access over inexpensive
telephone lines to customers.18 5 Moreover, the Universal Service
Fund mechanism-paid only by basic service providers-has con-
179. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 974.
180. Id. at 1006-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 221.
182. Id. at 219-21.
183. Oxman, supra note 146, at 3.
184. Id. at 3.




tributed significantly to the high level of wireline telephone ser-
vice penetration in the United States while the exemption of en-
hanced service providers ("ESPs") from access charges has made it
possible for ISPs to provide Internet access to end users on an in-
expensive, flat rate basis.18 6 The deregulatory environment cre-
ated by the FCC in the 1980s and 1990s for Internet services fos-
tered the rapid growth of the Internet. 8 7 By the late 1990s, there
were over 6,000 ISPs offering dial-up Internet access, with a sig-
nificant number of users relying on small or mid-size ISPs for
their service. 188 From 1993, the year the first commercial web
browser came onto the market, to 1997, the number of computers
linked to the Internet grew from 1.3 million to 16 million. 8 9
The early development of cable modem broadband services also
benefitted from the FCC policy. After the enactment of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, the FCC continued its policy of de-
regulation by correlating the Computer H categorization of en-
hanced and basic services to the 1996 Act's terminologies of "in-
formation" and "telecommunication" services and by preserving
the unregulated status of the ISPs as an information service. 90 In
an effort to foster the growth of the new high-speed data service,
the FCC chose to treat the DSL services as telecommunications
services and required telephone companies to make the services
available to ISPs on a nondiscriminatory basis, while leaving cable
modem services completely unregulated.' 91 In the late 1990s, the
Agency's policy was positive in fostering competitive broadband
deployment because cable modems using video program transmis-
sion pipe were still new in the communications markets, while
186. Id. at 15-16. With universal service system, LECs were allowed to charge long
distance telephone companies (interexchange carriers, "IXCs") above cost to access their
local facilities, and with such implicit subsidies LECs were able to provide services to high-
cost rural areas with affordable rates below cost. Id. at 15. ESPs were exempted from such
per-minute based access charge that IXCs were required to pay because FCC determined
that ESPs were not subject to Title II regulation, and in terms of their telephone network
usage, they should be treated as end users rather than as carriers. Id. at 16-17.
187. Id. at 3.
188. Oxman, supra note 146, at 17 (citing Downes, Thomas and Shane Greenstein, "Do
Commercial ISPs Provide Universal Access?" (1998), available at
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/greenstein/images/htmResearch/chapters/Do
Commercial ISPs Provide Universal Access.pdf).
189. Id. at 4.
190. Id. at 18 (citing Universal Service Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501).
191. Oxman, supra note 146, at 19, 21 (citing GTE Telephone Operating Companies
Tariff No. 1, 13 F.C.C.R. 22466 (1998); Applications For Consent to The Transfer of Control
of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations From Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor to
AT&T Corp., Transferee, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160 (1999)).
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telephone lines had been deployed for decades. 192 Today, the top
ten cable broadband providers hold a 54% share of the broadband
market with 35.3 million subscribers.
193
While the FCC continued moving toward additional deregula-
tion in the new millennium, which led to the issuance of Cable
Modem Declaratory Ruling and the Wireline Broadband Order-
the latter being at issue in the present case, the landscape of the
telecommunications market has gone through major changes after
a series of mergers and acquisitions. The monopoly of AT&T and
the Bell Systems ended with the divesture of AT&T in 1984.194
Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, a series of mergers oc-
curred among the BOCs, which had split from the old AT&T, to-
gether with a number of other telephone companies, resulting in
only three regional BOCs. 195 Similarly, the cable markets had
fallen under the control of a few giant players through mergers
and acquisitions. 196 By 2006, each of the top ten broadband pro-
viders was a regional monopoly in either cable or DSL service.
197
Together, these companies controlled 83% of the broadband mar-
ket. 98 The two platforms dominated 98% of the entire broadband
market with satellites, wireless, and power-line broadband ser-
vices accounting for no greater than 2% of the market.199 By the
end of the second quarter of 2008, the top twenty cable and tele-
phone companies constituted about 94% of the broadband mar-
192. Oxman, supra note 146, at 18.
193. Leichtman Research Group Research,
http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/research/notesO9-2008.pdf (last visited October 12,
2008).
194. See supra note 114.
195. See Cybertelecom :: Timeline, http://www.cybertelecom.org/notes/timeline.htm (last
visited October 12, 2008). After the merger of Bell South and AT&T (SBC, the old South-
western Bell, acquired AT&T in 2005 and renamed as AT&T) in 2006, the three ROBCs left
were Verizon, AT&T and Qwest. Id. See also Cybertelecom :: Mergers,
http://www.cybertelecom.orglbroadband/merger.htm (last visited October 12, 2008); FCC,
High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of June 30, 2007 at 13 (2008), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatchDOC-280906Al.pdf.
196. See List of cable companies, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilList_of_cable-companies#UnitedStates (last visited October
12, 2008). The five biggest cable companies by number of subscribers are Comcast, Time
Warner Cable, Cox Communications, Charter Communications and Cablevision, with Com-
cast and Time Warner controlling more than 70% (37.3 million) of the total subscribers of
the top five companies (52.3 million). Id.
197. Turner, S. Derek, Broadband Reality Check II: The Truth Behind America's Digital
Decline at 19-20 (2006), available at http://www.freepress.netfilesbbrc2-final.pdf, a report
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ket.200 Other statistics also indicate that the broadband market
has become a series of regional duopolies. For example, based on
the 2006 data, Sprint, the largest non-ILEC ISP, accounted for
less than 2% of the entire broadband market;20 1 and according to a
study conducted by the Government Accountability Office
("GAO"), the median number of broadband providers available to
consumers was two.
20 2
Competition has been further reduced by the FCC's 2005 Wire-
line Broadband Order, deregulating DSL service and freeing
ILECs from being required to provide competing ISPs with non-
discriminatory open access to their "last-mile" infrastructure.
20 3
According to the FCC's latest report, as of June 2007, 97% of
ADSL20 4 connections were being provided by the ILECs or their
affiliates, while competing ISPs accounting for only 3% of market
share. 20 5 The market share of non-ILEC ISPs has declined in each
of the last five years.20 6 Obviously, the FCC's policy as expressed
through Wireline Broadband Order and Cable Modem Declaratory
Ruling has not achieved the Agency's statutory objective in pro-
moting competition; 20 7 nor has the Agency's argument that ILECs
have incentives to make their facilities available to the non-ILEC
ISPs at a reasonable rate squared with the actual market data.
208
Indeed, the Agency's regulatory policy has failed to fulfill the
goal stated by the Bush Administration to provide universal and
200. Leichtman Research Group Press Releases,
http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/081108release.html (last visited October 12,
2008).
201. Turner, supra note 197, at 19.
202. Id. at 21.
203. Id. at 20. "Last-mile" broadband infrastructure refers to the telephone or cable
wires that deliver broadband to the homes of consumers. Id. at 22.
204. ADSL stands for Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line, which provides speeds in one
direction greater than speeds in the other direction (the most commonly used DSL service).
FCC, supra note 195, at 13. ADSL "allows faster downstream data transmission over the
same line used to provide voice service, without disrupting regular telephone calls on that
line." Getting Broadband, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/highspeedinternet.html
(last visited October 12, 2008). Symmetric Digital Subscriber Line ("SDSL) provides equal
speeds for downstream and upstream traffic "used by business for services such as video
conferencing. Id.
205. FCC, supra note 195, at 13.
206. Turner, supra note 197, at 21, fig.15.
207. In stating its goal in issuing Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, the FCC stated that
its broadband policy "will first and foremost be guided by, and grounded in, the Communi-
cations Act. Furthermore, as a policy matter, [the FCC] recognize[s] that the statutory
objectives to promote competition and universal service have not changed." Cable Modem
Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 3021.
208. The court in Time Warner addressed and accepted the FCC's argument in the opin-
ion. See Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 222 (citing Wireline Broadband Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at
14892-94).
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affordable broadband access by 2007.209 The reality is this: the
United States is falling significantly behind the rest of the devel-
oped world in broadband penetration, as well as in broadband
speed and price. 210 During the 2000-2005 period, the United
States dropped from fourth to twelfth place in broadband penetra-
tion and dropped further to fifteenth place in 2007.211 Because of
the lack of competition, U.S. consumers pay higher prices yet get
slower speeds for broadband connections as compared with other
developed countries. 212  In 2006, the U.S. ranked 13 among 30
OECD members in terms of the price that consumers were paying
per megabit per second ("Mbps") of broadband connections. 213 The
situation is getting worse. According to the most recent OECD
report, the ranking of the U.S. in prices has dropped further to 18
in 2007.214 Consumers in Japan, the country ranked number one,
paid 13 cents per Mbps per month, while Americans pay $2.83-
about 22 times higher.
215
The FCC's argument in the Wireline Broadband Order that its
deregulation policy fosters competition and growth in the broad-
band market has proved to be unsound, although its reasoning
supporting parity treatment between cable broadband and wire-
line broadband may have some merit. Affording the same policy
considerations to both cable and DSL services, however, does not
necessarily mean that both must be deregulated by eliminating
the open access requirement. What the FCC should have done
was to require both local telephone companies (ILECs) and cable
209. Turner, supra note 197, at 7 (citing Remarks by President George W. Bush, March
26, 2004, Albuquerque, N.M., available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040326-9.html).
210. Turner, supra note 197, at 3-4.
211. Id, at 8 (citing Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband). The latest OECD report on broadband growth and
policies shows that eight countries, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Korea, Nor-
way, Iceland, Finland and Sweden, led the 30 OECD members in broadband penetration.
OECD, Broadband Growth and Policies in OECD Countries at 25 (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/57/40629067.pdf.
212. Turner, supra note 197, at 14.
213. See OECD Report: In US Broadband Is Really Expensive,
http://gigaom.com/2007/07/13/oecd-report-in-us-broadband-is-reallyexpensive/ (last visited
October 12, 2008). Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) "has
been one of the world's largest and most reliable sources of comparable statistics, and eco-
nomic and social data." About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ (follow "About OECD" hyper-
link) (last visited October 18, 2008).
214. OECD, supra note 211, at 43. In 2006, the number was 15 times higher in the U.S.
than it in Japan. See OECD Report: In US Broadband Is Really Expensive,
http://gigaom.com/2007/07/13/oecd-report-in-us-broadband-is-really-expensive/ (last visited
October 12, 2008).
215. OECD, supra note 211, at 43.
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companies that own the "last-mile" facilities to provide to compet-
ing ISPs with open access to their infrastructure on a nondis-
criminatory basis. While the deregulation policy afforded to cable
modem service during its early deployment period helped it grow,
notwithstanding the competition coming from well-deployed tele-
phone lines, it has already surpassed DSL service in broadband
markets, and any favorable regulatory policy afforded to cable
broadband has become unnecessary. An open and nondiscrimina-
tory access rule is the correct way to promote competition and to
benefit consumers by making it possible for non-facility-based
ISPs to break the cable and telephone companies' duopolies and to
become recognizable players in the broadband market.
The FCC has been given all the statutory power it needs in or-
der to expand its deregulation policy by Congress through the
1996 Act. 216 The FCC also maintains great flexibility to use its
broad Title I ancillary jurisdiction in making decisions, as long as
it makes its case based on what is perceived to be the "public in-
terest."2
17
Courts have been affording great deference to the FCC's deci-
sions and reasoning. Except for Computer III, which did not pass
judicial review and therefore was not implemented as planned, all
the other relevant rulings, from the first two Computer Inquiries
to the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, the Wireline Broadband
Order, and the Contribution Methodology on VoIP, have been up-
held and endorsed by reviewing courts. By using the Chevron
"reasonable" standard and by deferring to the FCC's conclusions
in the "technical" and "complex" broadband area, courts essen-
tially have not imposed any meaningful judicial oversight over
Agency decisions as long as the Agency provides some reasoning
and argument in support of its position, whether plausible or not.
Courts do not question the methods that the FCC uses in collect-
ing evidence and in compiling statistical data, nor do they ques-
tion whether the Agency's conclusions about the current and fu-
ture market conditions are sound.218 The policy of deregulating
DSL services and cable broadband services coupled with the con-
216. The 1996 Act granted authority to the FCC to order telephone companies to elimi-
nate their tariffs imposed by Title II regulation. See supra text accompanying note 134.
See also Frieden, supra note 150, at 415.
217. See supra text accompanying note 138. See also Frieden, supra note 150, at 415.
218. Frieden, supra note 150, at 421. For example, in supporting its regulatory deci-
sions, the FCC generated optimistic market penetration and competition data, which did
not square with the data compiled by unbiased organizations, such as OECD and Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union. Id, at 421-23, n.183.
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tinuous mergers of telephone and cable companies has resulted in
the creation of duopolies in the broadband market, despite the
FCC's stipulation that the policy is designed to promote competi-
tion. Courts, however, remain willing to defer Agency's rationales
and projections.
219
Precisely as Justice Scalia stated in his dissenting opinion in
Brand X, the FCC, by using the classification of telecommunica-
tions and information service, coupled with its broadly construed
ancillary jurisdiction, can freely determine-in its sole discre-
tion-whether to or not to impose an obligation to a particular
service. 220 The FCC can even determine whether to regulate a
service without first determining its classification, provided that
the Agency believes that such a classification will bring an unde-
sired result. The Contribution Methodology ruling on VoIP is a
perfect illustration of this principle. VoIP service is provided
through Internet access and is obviously more like an information
service, which would not be subject to Title II regulation, than like
a telecommunications service. 221 The FCC, by using its ancillary
power has, nevertheless, made VoIP subject to the universal ser-
vice obligation, rendering it a de facto telecommunications service
without any determination of its classification. 222
Justice Scalia's concern over the FCC's overly expanded power,
exercised with virtually no oversight, is completely legitimate,
particularly when considering that the United States is lagging
behind the rest of the world in broadband services largely because
of the FCC's regulatory policies. The failure of the FCC's policy
may also be evidenced by its current proposal in October 2008 of a
new plan, which will overhaul the telecommunications regulations
for the purpose of promoting the development of affordable broad-
219. See id.
220. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1013-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The FCC, in its Cable
Modem Declaratory Ruling, determined that the Title II common carrier regulation did not
apply to cable companies; however, it did invite comment on whether it should use its Title
I jurisdiction to require cable companies to provide independent ISPs nondiscriminatory
access to their cable lines. Id. at 979. (citing Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R.
at 4839). Commenting on this part of the ruling, Justice Scalia pointed out the irony of the
FCC's authority to "turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic discretions," to-wit: the
FCC rendered its Title II regulatory authority inapplicable to cable modem service by clas-
sifying the service as a sole "telecommunication service," yet, by using its Title I ancillary
jurisdiction, the Agency can order cable companies to "unbundle" the telecommunications
component of their service, and as a consequence, cable companies would then become
subject to Title II regulation. Id. at 1013-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
221. See supra notes 175, 177.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 176, 177.
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band networks. 223 Although it is not unreasonable for an appel-
late court to follow the Supreme Court's footprint in endorsing the
FCC's order that has created duopolies and has discouraged com-
petitions, it is time for reviewing courts to take a closer look at the
FCC's decisions and reasoning and to provide more rigorous judi-
cial oversight over the Agency's regulatory power.
Liu Duan
223. See FCC overhaul eyes broadband but could raise bills (AP),
http://tech.yahoo.com/news/ap/20081015/apon_hi_te/tec fcc telecom_overhaul 5 (last
visited October 22, 2008). In October 2008, the FCC came up with a new proposal to over-
haul the "intercarrier compensation" and Universal Service Fund systems for the purpose
of promoting the development of affordable broadband networks. Id. The Agency has
planned to vote on the proposal in a meet scheduled for November 4, 2008. Id.
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